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Commercial space companies will soon be the primary method of launching people and
supplies into orbit. Among the critical aspects of space launches are the meteorological
concerns. Laws and regulations pertaining to meteorological considerations have been
created to ensure the safety of the space industry and those living around spaceports; but,
are they adequate? Perhaps the commercial space industry can turn to the commercial
aviation industry to help answer that question. Throughout its history, the aviation
industry has dealt with lessons learned from mishaps due to failures in understanding the
significance of weather impacts on operations. Using lessons from the aviation industry,
the commercial space industry can preempt such accidents and maintain viability as an
industry. Using Lanicci’s Strategic Planning Model, this study identified the weather
needs of the commercial space industry by conducting three gap analyses. First, a
comparative analysis was done between laws and regulations in commercial aviation and
those in the commercial space industry pertaining to meteorological support, finding a
“legislative gap” between the two industries, as no legal guarantee is in place to ensure
weather products remain available to the commercial space industry. A second analysis
was conducted between the meteorological services provided for the commercial aviation
iii

industry and commercial space industry, finding a gap at facilities not located at an
established launch facility or airport. At such facilities, many weather observational
technologies would not be present, and would need to be purchased by the company
operating the spaceport facility. A third analysis was conducted between the
meteorological products and regulations that are currently in existence, and those needed
for safe operations within the commercial space industry, finding gaps in predicting
lightning, electric field charge, and space weather. Recommendations to address these
deficiencies have been generated for the Federal Aviation Administration, U.S. Congress,
commercial space launch companies, and areas are identified for further research.
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Chapter I
Introduction
For the first 50 years of space launches in the US, the Federal Government
dominated the industry. With the conclusion of the Space Transportation System (Space
Shuttle) and the cancelation of the Constellation program, the commercial spaceflight
industry will soon become the prominent contributor to low-Earth orbit (LEO) space
operations within the US (Office of Science and Technology Policy & National
Aeronautics and Space Administration [NASA], 2010). While scientists and engineers
who have worked for the federal government may transition into the private sector, there
is expected to be a learning curve as new untested rockets are developed, as seen with
early launches by the commercial company, Space Exploration Technologies (SpaceX)
(SpaceX, 2012). During this transition, many issues must to be scrutinized to ensure the
safe operation of both manned and unmanned flight activities.
Among the issues facing new space launch companies, weather safety will be one
of the most important. Weather safety has significantly impacted operations of past space
launches, both in the US and abroad (Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle
Challenger Accident, 1986; Uman & Rakov, 2003). The commercial aviation industry
had a similar experience in its early days, with weather causing the majority of accidents
(Allaz, 1998). This study examined the commercial aviation industry for weather-safety
lessons learned that can be adopted by the commercial space industry to assist in the
prevention of costly accidents that could set the commercial space industry back during a
crucial period in its development.
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Significance of the Study
This study was used to help determine the implications of proper meteorological
support for the operations of the commercial space industry. For the commercial space
industry to expand, high investor confidence must exist. Without large amounts of
investment capital and public support, the entire industry could falter prior to becoming
self-sufficient, as the airline industry almost experienced prior to becoming nearly selfsufficient. Public and investor confidence is built through a successful record of launches,
minimal ground or airborne accidents, and no loss of life. The recommendations of this
study seek to clarify safety concerns regarding proper meteorological support to help
provide stability for the commercial space industry.
Ultimately, this study could make recommendations to the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) for revising the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) to cover the
meteorological considerations of the commercial space industry. It also could provide a
recommended amendment to U.S. Code, entitled National and Commercial Space
Programs (2010), to expand the mandate of the National Weather Service (NWS) to
include commercial space operations in its aviation obligations. Recommendations, based
upon the results of this study, could also be made to individual launch operators and
weather support personnel to adapt their “launch commit criteria” to ensure that
comprehensive operational meteorological procedures exist for all weather considerations
of orbital missions.
Statement of the Problem
As the airline industry expanded, regulation was slow to follow, often spurred by
accidents that cost lives and caught the public’s attention (Bailey, 2002). Accidents,
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caused in large part due to the lack of regulation prior to the Air Commerce Act of 1926
and the introduction of the Civil Aeronautics Authority in 1938, caused public reluctance
to fly due to the industry’s unreliable safety record (Bilstein, 2001). It was at this time in
aviation that meteorological regulations were created to provide necessary limits on the
aviation industry that could not be bypassed except in emergencies. These regulations
included specific takeoff and landing minima, rules for flying in and around clouds, rules
for flying around thunderstorms, and many others.
The development of the commercial space industry is now underway, mirroring
many of the challenges and hurdles encountered by the development and expansion of
commercial aviation in the first half of the 20th century. Without appropriate preemptive
regulation, the commercial space industry could undergo significant setbacks, in both
financial and investor confidence, which could devastate the development of the industry
as a whole.
It is hypothesized that there is a disparity in overarching regulations that exist
between the commercial space industry and commercial airline industry concerning
meteorological support. The meteorological regulations in place for the commercial space
industry are not as comprehensive as those for the aviation industry (Aviation Programs,
2012; National and Commercial Space Programs, 2010). It is also hypothesized that the
current meteorological regulations do not meet the requirements needed for the safe
expansion of the commercial space industry. Due to the significantly higher costs of
spaceflight ventures, comprehensive meteorological safety regulations should be in place
prior to the significant expansion of spaceflight activities. Regulatory inequities between
meteorological services provided to the aviation industry and those provided to the
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commercial space industry must be bridged. If investments are made for preventive
regulation and safe operations, the development of the commercial space industry will be
enhanced significantly. With the appropriate regulations in place, the industry can forego
repeating the mistakes of the early aviation industry.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this study was to identify the gaps between the aviation and the
commercial space industries regarding meteorological regulations, services, and products
in order to estimate the meteorological data and analyze requirements of the commercial
space industry. This evaluation was accomplished by analyzing the services offered by
the NWS Aviation Weather Center (AWC), applicable to the commercial space industry,
as well as support provided by the 45th Weather Squadron of the U.S. Air Force for space
launches at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS) and NASA Kennedy Space
Center (KSC).
Research Questions
Q1: Does a gap exist in meteorological regulations between the commercial
aviation industry and the commercial space industry?
Q2: Does a gap exist between meteorological services provided for commercial
aviation companies and airports and meteorological services provided for commercial
space companies and spaceports?
Q3: Does the meteorological products and regulations for the commercial space
industry meet the estimated needs of commercial space operators?
Delimitations
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The data on current meteorological considerations of the commercial space
industry were based upon research performed on past space launch ventures, both public
and commercial. The review examples may not accurately represent the needs and
requirements of every company, since there are too many companies developing launch
and flight vehicles to adequately cover each type of vehicle. Designs were selected based
upon the current trend of commercial launch programs in the US. For the purposes of this
study, needs of commercial space operators were restricted to the near future (i.e., next
10 years) . This is to better compare operations to early aviation. Additionally, operations
discussed in this study were limited to launch operations.
Limitations and Assumptions
Due to the sensitive and competitive nature of commercial space companies,
companies were not willing to provide their meteorological data requirements. Therefore,
approximations were made to best fit the requirements, based upon historical
requirements. These approximations were made based upon current research and account
for weather sensitivities experienced by companies in the past, or requirements derived
from spacecraft design. Many methods exist to measure the weather phenomena
described in this study. An analysis of each would have overshadowed other important
factors of this study. Therefore, only commonly used methods of observing these weather
phenomena were discussed.
Definitions of Terms
Cloud Ceiling: The lowest layer of clouds reported as broken or overcast, or over
50% sky cover (FAA, 2010)
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Meteorology Regulations: Federal regulations pertaining to meteorological
phenomena, technology, operations, and safety in the chapter
entitled Commercial Space Transportation (2012), the sections
entitled General Operating and Flight Rules (2012) and Operating
Requirements: Domestic, Flag, and Supplemental Operations
(2012) in the CFR, and U.S. Code under National and Commercial
Space Programs (2010).
Launch Operator: The holder of a Launch Operator license, as defined by federal
regulation in Types of Launch Licenses (2011). A holder is
authorized to conduct launches from one launch site using a single
family of vehicles with a specified type of payload, per license.
Launch Overpressure: Loads placed on a rocket by the initial engine exhaust
interacting with the launch pad and launch pad ductwork (Troclet,
Alestra, Terrasse, Jeanjean, & Srithammavanh, 2005).
Launch Site Operator: The holder of a license to operate a launch site under
federal regulations in License to Operate a Launch Site (2011).
Mean Sea Level: The average level of the surface of the sea between high and low
water (Sea level, 2011).
Triboelectrification: The generation of an electrical charge caused by friction,
used in this study, between the launch vehicle and ice particles
(Natural and Triggered Lightning Flight Commit Criteria, 2011).
List of Acronyms
ACA

Accuracy to Cost Analysis
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AIM

Aeronautical Information Manual

ASOS

Automated Surface Observing System

AST

FAA Office of Commercial Space Transportation

ATIS

Automatic Terminal Information Service

AWC

Aviation Weather Center

AWOS

Automated Weather Observing System

CAA

Civil Aviation Authority

CFR

Code of Federal Regulations

CCAFS

Cape Canaveral Air Force Station

CIP

Current Icing Product

CME

Coronal Mass Ejection

CST

Commercial Space Transportation

DOT

Department of Transportation

FAA

Federal Aviation Administration

FSS

Flight Service Station

ICAO

International Civil Aviation Organization

IFR

Instrument Flight Rules

JAXA

Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency

KSC

Kennedy Space Center

LEO

Low-Earth Orbit

LLWAS

Low Level Windshear Alert System

LSO

Launch Site Operator

METAR

Meteorological Aerodrome Report

8
MSL

Mean Sea Level

NLDN

National Lightning Detection Network

NWS

National Weather Service

OV

Orbital Vehicle

PIREP

Pilot Weather Report

SEP

Solar Energetic Particles

SpaceX

Space Exploration Technologies Corporation

SRB

Solid Rocket Booster

STS

Space Transportation System

TAF

Aerodrome Forecast

TIBS

Telephone Information Briefing Service

TOA

Time of Arrival

TWA

Trans Western Airlines

USPLN

United States Precision Lightning Network

VFR

Visual Flight Rules
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Chapter II
Review of the Relevant Literature
History of Meteorology in the Aviation Industry
Anyone who has ever been stuck in an airport because a flight was delayed or
canceled due to weather can respect the importance of weather to the aviation industry.
Weather played an important role in many early aviation accidents. Early commercial
aviation exploits in the United States were largely backed by air mail contracts from the
U.S. Post Office (Allaz, 1998). Prior to 1930, airlines received contracts to deliver the
mail based on the weight of mail bags. This led to smaller aircraft being developed, rather
than the larger passenger aircraft. The Waters Act of 1930 altered contract rates to an
amount governed by the available capacity of the aircraft, not the weight of the mail
being provided (Allaz, 1998). This sparked the development and use of larger aircraft and
led to airlines seeking passengers as a means of expanding revenue for flights. To attract
passengers, however, the safety record and comfort level of the population needed to be
improved (Allaz, 1998).
Between 1920 and 1927, airmail pilots were forced to land 6,469 times, or an
average of once for every 2,380 miles flown (Allaz, 1998). Over that time, the cause of
forced landings shifted from 46% mechanical and 54% weather-related to 14%
mechanical and 86% weather-related, as forced landings increased from just over 300 a
year to just over 1,000 a year (Allaz, 1998). This increase was consistent with an increase
in traffic, though often the public was only cognizant of the number of accident, rather
than the percentage of accidents (Meisinger, 1920). A significant spike in accidents was
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noted in 1921 due to the introduction of night flights prior to the advent of lighted
airways (Allaz, 1998).
Many early airline operators had false impressions about weather on air routes.
Airline operators would fly a route less than a dozen times and use the interpretation of
the weather conditions, such as winds, turbulence, cloud cover, and fog, as an indication
of whether the weather conditions would be appropriate to fly a route. In a time when
meteorologists did not truly understand many aspects of the atmosphere, airline operators
were making weather generalizations that inevitably would lead to the deaths of pilots
and the loss of cargo (Meisinger, 1920). Meisinger further identified the damage that
weather-related accidents did to the public image of aviation, citing it as a hazard to the
overall growth of the aviation industry.
Werrell (2010) also highlighted the negative impact weather had on aviation,
particularly on the U.S. Army Air Corps’ handling of the air mail in 1934. He cited a
particularly poor winter weather season and the lack of appropriate meteorological
training and instrumentation as a leading cause in the skyrocketing death-rate of airmail
pilots, from an average of 12.4 in 1933 to 10 deaths within the first month of 1934.
Weather-ignorant pilots would make mistakes, flying into weather conditions well
beyond their skills, such as heavy snowstorms in the winter and thunderstorms in the
summer. Newspapers of the day covered every crash closely, casting a shadow of doubt
on aviation as a successful mode of transportation, intentionally or otherwise (Associated
Press, 1928; United Press, 1934). One particular accident hit close to home for legislators
in Washington D.C., forcing the issue of the need for regulation (Bailey, 2002). A Trans
Western Airline (TWA) Douglas DC-2 ran out of fuel and crashed while trying to find a
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path through fog on May 6, 1935. Among the casualties was United States Senator
Bronson Cutting of New Mexico, a very well-liked Senator (Associated Press, 1935). The
result was the formation of the Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA) in 1938, which finally
created a body responsible for enforcing safety in aviation (Bailey, 2002).
The CAA had the authority to create regulations pertaining to any aspects
affecting the safety of aviation, including the first regulations covering weather. While
the CAA tailored meteorological regulations to commercial aviation, the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938 also changed the mandate on the Weather Bureau, the
predecessor of the NWS, to include specific requirements pertaining to aviation. Included
were instructions to create offices and weather stations needed to support aviation and to
provide current reports, forecasts, and warnings to air carriers and other civil operations,
including private operations (Civil Aeronautics Act, 1938). Though the technology and
procedures have been updated, the language of this code has been maintained and the
basic responsibilities are still in place. The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 expanded the
required operations to include the necessary standards to meet international aviation
meteorology requirements and to transfer oversight responsibility for the Weather Bureau
from the Department of Agriculture to the Department of Commerce (Federal Aviation
Act, 1958).
Despite the implementation of the Civil Aeronautics Act, aircraft accidents due to
adverse weather conditions persisted. At times, the FAA, the descendent of the CAA, has
been unable to foresee the necessary technology or procedures to prevent the loss of life
through weather-related accidents. One notable example is the development of the LowLevel Windshear Alert System (LLWAS) following the crash of Eastern Airlines Flight
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66 in 1975 (Meyer, Isaminger, & Proseus, 1999). The Boeing 727 was attempting to
make an approach into New York’s John F. Kennedy International Airport too close to a
thunderstorm. Flight 66 was caught in windshear and struck the approach lighting system
just short of the runway (National Transportation Safety Board, 1976). The original
LLWAS system consisted of six wind sensors, one at the center of the airfield and five
spread around the outskirts of the field. When another fatal accident caused by windshear
occurred, Delta Air Lines Flight 191 into Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport in
1985, an update to the system was made to reduce the false-alarm rate and the
development of windshear alerting systems onboard aircraft to identify rapid changes in
wind speed or direction (Meyer et al., 1999).
Aviation-related meteorology CFRs. Due to accidents such as those described
above, a variety of all-encompassing regulations has been established to prevent weatherrelated accidents from occurring. These requirements can be drawn from three primary
locations: 14 CFR Part 91: Air Traffic General Operating and Flight Rules (2012), 14
CFR Part 121: Operating Requirements: Domestic, Flag, and Supplemental Operations
(2012), and the Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) (FAA, 2012).
14 CFR Part 91: Air Traffic General Operating Rules. The Air Traffic General
Operating Rules (2012) contain the primary source for meteorological regulation for all
of aviation. These rules cover all private and commercial of flight, from general aviation
aircraft, to wide-bodied commercial transport aircraft. Meteorological requirements are
divided into two categories: Visual flight rules (VFR) and Instrument flight rules (IFR)
(FAA, 2012).
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VFR flight describes flight for any aircraft not flying within clouds, obscurations
to visibility, or precipitation (FAA, 2012). The CFR has very specific requirements for
aircraft flying around clouds and in situations where visibility is restricted. Table 1 lists
the visibility and cloud clearance minimums for VFR traffic in different airspaces. Class
A airspace, located at or above 18,000 feet above mean sea level (MSL), is not included
since VFR flight is not permitted in Class A airspace (Basic VFR Weather Minimums,
2004). Though complicated, this system provides specific restrictions to flight traffic in
areas of different types of air traffic. Specifically, Class D through B airspaces surround
airports with increasing levels of traffic from Class D to Class B (FAA, 2012).
For flight within clouds or any other obscuration, aircraft are controlled under
IFR. Aircraft must be certified with additional equipment, and pilots must undergo
additional training to fly in instrument conditions. In addition, to perform an instrument
approach into an airport, approach equipment must be provided at the airport and
approach procedures must be in place (Takeoff and Landing Under IFR, 2009). Because
of these requirements, the general operating rules for flying in IFR conditions are much
more stringent but less complicated than VFR rules. The primary consideration in IFR is
the ability to safely takeoff and land an aircraft. To take off, the visibility must be above a
half statute mile for aircraft operating with two engines and one mile for aircraft
operating with one engine, unless the airport has minimum takeoff conditions listed. In
that case, takeoff conditions must be above the minimum takeoff conditions listed in the
instrument procedures for the airport (Takeoff and Landing Under IFR, 2009).
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Table 1
Basic VFR Weather Minimums for Aviation.
Airspace

Flight Visibility

Distance from clouds

Class B

3 Statute Miles

Clear of Clouds

Class C

3 Statute Miles

500ft below, 1,000 ft.
above, and 2000ft.
horizontally

Class D

3 Statute Miles

500ft below, 1,000 ft.
above, and 2000ft.
horizontally

Class E: Less than 10,000
ft. MSL

3 Statute Miles

500ft below, 1,000 ft.
above, and 2000ft.
horizontally

Class E: At or above 10,000
ft. MSL

5 Statute Miles

1,000 ft. below and above, 1
Statute Mile horizontally

Class G: 1,200 ft. or less
above the surface (Daytime)

1 Statute Mile

Clear of Clouds

3 Statute Miles

500ft below, 1,000 ft.
above, and 2000ft.
horizontally

Class G: More than 1,200 ft.
above the surface but less
than 10,000 ft. MSL
(Daytime)

1 Statute Mile

500ft below, 1,000 ft.
above, and 2000ft.
horizontally

Class G: More than 1,200 ft.
above the surface but less
than 10,000 ft. MSL
(Nighttime)

3 Statute Miles

500ft below, 1,000 ft.
above, and 2000ft.
horizontally

Class G: More than 1,200 ft.
above the surface

5 Statute Miles

1,000 ft. below and above, 1
Statute Mile horizontally

Flight below controlled
airspace and less than
10,000 ft. with special
clearance (Special VFR)

1 Statute Mile

Clear of Clouds

Class G: 1,200 ft. or less
above the surface
(Nighttime)

Note. From Basic VFR Weather Minimums (2004).
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14 CFR Part 121: Operating Requirements: Domestic, Flag, and Supplemental
Operations. The Operating Requirements for Domestic, Flag and Supplemental
Operations (2012) provide additional requirements on meteorological considerations for
operators for compensation or hire that must be followed in addition to the General
Operating and Flight Rules. There are five primary sections within this part of the CFR
that directly concern weather. For comparison purposes, only regulations concerning
takeoff and enroute flight will be examined.
The Operating Requirements: Domestic, Flag and Supplemental Operations states
that an aircraft cannot be dispatched for flight unless the person dispatching the aircraft is
“thoroughly familiar” with the reported and forecasted conditions for the route of the
flight. While the definition of “thoroughly familiar” is not clearly stated or defined, this
requirement is used to ensure that no aircraft can take off without an approved staff
member of the airline reviewing the relevant meteorological data pertaining to the
specific flight (Familiarity with Weather Conditions, 1996). These regulations also
require an operator to prove it has a method for “obtaining, maintaining and distributing”
weather data, specifically prevailing wind conditions when visibility is restricted. This
ensures that in times of adverse weather, pilots have access to the general direction of the
wind to ensure the safety of the flight and the use of a proper takeoff or landing heading
(Airports: Required Data, 2007).
The Operating Requirements (2012) also cover additional takeoff minima for
operations in VFR. In addition to the requirements imposed by the general operating rules
discussed above, domestic and international flights for compensation or hire must meet
stricter requirements for taking-off. An aircraft in Class G airspace may be able to take
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off with clouds making up greater than 50% of the sky, commonly referred to as a
ceiling, with clouds in the hundreds of feet above the surface, as long as the aircraft
remains clear of the clouds. A commercial aircraft in that same airspace must ensure at
least a 1,000 foot ceiling prior to taking off, as well as one statute mile visibility during
the day, and 2 statute miles of visibility at night. The visibility requirement can be
reduced to a half mile if the obstruction is located at the surface and all of the flight
beyond one mile of the airport boundary can be made outside of the obscuration (Takeoff
and Landing Minimums: VFR: Domestic Operations, 1991). Additionally, this part of the
federal regulations covers takeoff minimums for IFR operations specific to commercial
carriers. This section provides some leniency in the IFR takeoff minimums established in
the general rules. As the aircraft operated by commercial carriers have more advanced
and more precise equipment, the holder of a commercial certificate may get specific
approval in their operations specifications to takeoff in conditions lower than those in the
general rules (Takeoff and Landing Minimums: IFR: All Certificate Holders, 2007).
Finally, a low-altitude windshear system with approved flight guidance, or a
similar system capable of detecting and providing avoidance messages, must be equipped
on all aircraft built after 1991 (Low-altitude Windshear System Equipment
Requirements, 1990). Systems like these significantly improve the safety of the public on
commercial flights.
Aeronautical Information Manual. The AIM (FAA, 2012) provides the
fundamental elements required to fly within the United States airspace. The information
ranges from navigational aids and airport markings, to air traffic control and
meteorology. While this document contains information covered in other sections, such
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as weather minima for VFR flight covered in the Air Traffic General Operating Rules
(2012) of the CFR, this section will focus on information that does not appear in either
Air Traffic General Operating Rules or Operating Requirements: Domestic, Flag and
Supplemental Operations.
Presently, the dissemination of weather information is the joint responsibility of
the FAA and the NWS. Many of the products used by aviation come from the NWS, and
the NWS is responsible for approximately one quarter of the surface weather observing
equipment at civilian airports across the country (FAA, 2012). The NWS and the FAA
are both responsible for creating the products required by the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO), such as Meteorological Aerodrome Reports (METAR) (FAA,
2012).
By law, the NWS is responsible for creating products to ensure the safety of
aviation, including Inflight Advisories, Significant Meteorological Information
(SIGMETs), Convective SIGMETS, Airman’s Meteorological Information (AIRMETs)
and Area Forecasts (FAA, 2012). These products provide information on areas of weather
conditions that could be a potential hazard to aviation. Hazards advised in these products
include thunderstorms, icing, turbulence, dust or sandstorms, volcanic ash, tornadoes,
IFR conditions and hail. The NWS also provides information on the winds aloft from the
Service’s network of upper air measurements through the use of weather balloons
carrying instrument packages known as radiosondes, launched twice daily. The NWS
network of weather radars across the country provides for preflight weather planning,
among its many other uses. The radar sites can provide locations of light to heavy
precipitation, as well as wind conditions inside a storm. The FAA operates smaller radar
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sites to cover specific airports with higher resolution, typically in areas with heavy air
traffic. Weather products to be used for flight planning purposes are specified explicitly
by the FAA. Primary products are approved for use in flight planning, while
supplementary products, which may be experimental or less accurate, may be used in
conjunction with primary products in flight planning (FAA, 2012).
Combined with data from the FAA, private contractors, and supplemental
observers, the NWS provides hourly surface observation data from equipment owned by
the FAA or the NWS (FAA, 2012). Currently, these two agencies primarily use either the
Automated Weather Observing Systems (AWOS) or Automated Surface Observing
Systems (ASOS) for surface reports. These systems observe visibility between ¼ mile
and 10 statute miles; sensible weather, including precipitation and/or surface obscuration;
cloud ceiling and sky cover; air temperature and dew point; altimeter setting in inches of
mercury, representing surface pressure; and any additional information that may be useful
for aviation operations or forecasting future conditions. METARs are derived from these
systems hourly, often automatically. If conditions are rapidly changing, or the boundary
between IFR and VFR is being crossed during that hour, special METARs will be issued.
In addition to METARs, the ICAO requires Aerodrome Forecasts (TAF) to be produced,
which provides forecasted conditions within a 5-statue mile radius of the aerodrome for
between 24 and 30 hours in the future. TAFs are products produced every 6 hours by the
NWS, to provide forecasted weather conditions for many of the same measurement
parameters recorded in METARs, including winds, visibility, cloud cover and ceiling,
and sensible weather (FAA, 2012).
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The FAA also provides weather support for aviation. Presently, the FAA contracts
to maintain a nationwide network of Flight Service Stations (FSS) (FAA, 2012). These
stations, which can be either staffed or automated, provide different briefings based upon
the flight needs of a pilot. These briefings can be accessed by radio or telephone through
the use of the Telephone Information Briefing Service (TIBS). Air traffic controllers can
also issue weather avoidance assistance when radio communication traffic is not too high.
Though less accurate than NWS radar reports, these are available for pilots in-flight, and
relative position between an aircraft and radar reflectivity echoes can be established
relatively easily. Controllers are also required to request reports from pilots in certain
conditions. These pilot weather reports (PIREPs) are voluntary, but provide confirmation
of weather conditions when SIGMETs and AIRMETs are indicated (FAA, 2012).
Flying around thunderstorms can be particularly hazardous. Thunderstorms can
produce turbulence, hail, rain, snow, lightning, updrafts, downdrafts, and icing
conditions, and can affect an area 20 miles around the clouds producing the storm. Flight
within, underneath, or within a 20-mile radius of a thunderstorm is considered to be
hazardous, and is highly discouraged to ensure the safety of a flight (FAA, 2012).
History of Weather Impacts on the Space Industry
Lack of proper understanding of meteorological requirements has led to costly
accidents in the space launch industry, both in fiscal terms and human life. While many
space launch accidents have occurred, for the purposes of this study, three notable
historical examples in which weather played a major role will be discussed: the Space
Shuttle Challenger accident (Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger
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Accident, 1986), the loss of the NOZOMI probe (Yoshikawa et al., 2005), and the
Atlas/Centaur 67 rocket accident (Christian et al., 1989).
Space Shuttle Challenger. Challenger, designated as Operational Vehicle (OV)099, was the second operational Space Shuttle Orbiter created for the Space
Transportation System (STS) program, first flying in 1983 (Presidential Commission on
the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, 1986). Challenger made its last launch on January
28, 1986, on the scheduled mission STS-51-L. The cause of the accident was the failure
of two O-rings at one joint on the Space Shuttle’s Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB) during
launch. The failure of these O-rings to maintain a seal allowed hot gas to escape the SRB
joint, burning a hole in the External Tank, and igniting the fuel inside. The mount holding
the SRB to the External Tank failed, causing the upper portion of the SRB to breach the
upper portion of the External Tank. The rupturing tank and forces caused by the failing
SRB caused Challenger to break apart over the Atlantic Ocean, 73 seconds after ignition,
killing all seven astronauts on board including a civilian teacher (Presidential
Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, 1986). The launch configuration
of a Space Shuttle is shown in Figure 1.
The O-rings that failed were located in the joint of the SRB. As seen in Figure 2,
two O-rings are located at each joint of the SRB, a primary O-ring and a secondary Oring. The primary O-ring was designed to contain all of the heat and pressure of
combustion as the zinc chromate putty is burned away. However, the secondary O-ring
was designed to contain the heat and pressure fully, should the primary O-ring fail
(Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, 1986). On a prior
Shuttle launch, STS-51-C the year prior, the primary O-ring had failed, but the mission
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Figure 1. Space Shuttle Configuration, showing the Orbiter and the two SRBs attached to
the External Tank in the center. Note. Adapted from Presidential Commission on the
Space Shuttle Challenger Accident (1986).

was saved due to the proper operation of the secondary O-ring. This was evident on the
return of the booster after inspection, as soot was found between the primary and
secondary O-rings. The temperature at launch time for STS-51-C was 53 degrees
Fahrenheit, the coldest launch temperature at the time. For STS-51-L, the temperature at
launch was approximately 31 degrees Fahrenheit, and had been even colder the day prior.
Contractors from Thiokol, the company that designed and built the SRBs, admitted in a
meeting the day prior that they had concerns over the temperatures, but were pressured
into giving launch approval due to the heightened demand to launch after a series of
unrelated delays in days prior (Lighthall, 1991). The cold had decreased the integrity and
flexibility of these O-rings and, combined with the strongest variation of winds aloft of
any prior launch, the O-rings failed (Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle
Challenger Accident, 1986). One aspect that made this disaster even more damaging to
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Figure 2. An artist's representation of one of the four joints in each of the Space Shuttle's
SRBs. Note. The two O-rings are boxed in red; Adapted from Presidential Commission
on the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster (1986).

the image of manned spaceflight was the presence of Christa McAuliffe, the first member
of Teachers in Space to be scheduled for launch. This caused extensive media coverage,
and news of the accident spread rapidly (Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle
Accident, 1986).
NOZOMI space probe. The Mars Explorer “NOZOMI” was a space probe
developed by the Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) as their first
spacecraft to be sent to Mars (Yoshikawa et al., 2005). The probe was designed to study
the upper atmosphere of Mars, including the interactions of the solar winds with the
planet. Shortly after launch, the craft attempted to perform a maneuver to build up speed
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by passing close to Earth to use its gravitational pull to accelerate, a maneuver known as
a gravity assist. During this gravity assist, a failure occurred in the system providing the
fuel to the engine, and the acceleration was much less than planned. In order to continue
the mission, a series of gravity assists were used, which significantly increased the time
the probe would be in orbit around the Sun. During this time, NOZOMI was damaged by
the after-effects of a solar flare, disabling its power supply due to a short circuit in one of
the subsystems. This caused significant problems, including a failure of telemetry
communications and a failure to keep the fuel at a temperature above freezing.
Ultimately, the research team at JAXA was unable to revive NOZOMI fully, and the
probe was unable to enter Martian orbit. It is currently drifting in space in orbit around
the Sun (Yoshikawa et al., 2005).
Atlas Centaur 67. In 1987, the Atlas family of rockets had been used in the US
space program for 30 years, and to this day remains the oldest family of American
rockets currently flying (Walker & Powell, 2005). Weather conditions for the March 26
launch date included cloud cover over Cape Canaveral, with a very slow moving cold
front and squall line over the Florida panhandle extending into the Gulf of Mexico
(Christian et al., 1989). This system was creating cloud-to-ground lightning in the area,
but not within five nautical miles of the launch site within 42 minutes of the launch time,
nor had there been a single strike within 10 miles over the same time period. However,
the Atlas/Centaur rocket was struck by lightning 49 seconds following the launch,
causing a memory upset in the guidance-control electronics of the rocket, resulting in an
unplanned rotation. This rotation caused the rocket to overstress and it broke apart over
the Atlantic Ocean (Uman & Rakov, 2003). The subsequent investigation of the accident
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determined that a strong negative charge had built up over Cape Canaveral, detected by
the ground-based network of electrically sensitive instruments, known as field mills,
installed around KSC and CCAFS. This data, combined with other meteorological data
collected throughout the day, indicated that while there was no strong convection
occurring at the launch site, there was a sufficient electrical field gradient for a strike to
occur when the rocket was launched. The highly conductive exhaust plume from the
rocket created a low-resistance path, causing a lightning strike through the rocket
(Christian et al, 1989; Uman & Rakov, 2003).
Summary
Each new industry must overcome challenges in order to thrive; however, costly
setbacks could inhibit an industry from taking root. The commercial space industry must
overcome the challenges of operating safely, from launch to landing, and be cognizant of
adverse weather conditions that could significantly impact their success and the public’s
perception of the industry as a whole. Understanding the meteorological concerns for a
typical company can ensure that proper regulation is created to guide these space
companies to operate safely with respect to weather phenomena. The impact of remaining
ignorant of adverse weather conditions has been clearly demonstrated by accidents and
loss of people and equipment by government space agencies such as NASA, the U.S. Air
Force, and JAXA.
The commercial aviation industry and federal government have gone through an
evolution of lessons learned, and as a result, a number of laws and regulations related to
meteorology have been created that help to ensure the safe operation of aircraft in adverse
weather conditions. Many of these same types of laws and regulations can be applied to
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the commercial space industry. If these lessons can be learned without the loss of a
launch vehicle or human life, the commercial space industry has a much higher chance of
long-term success.
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Chapter III
Methodology
Research Approach
An adapted version of a strategic planning model, proposed by Lanicci (2003),
was used to organize the data used in this study. This model provided information on the
important phenomenological, technological, and resource considerations necessary to
analyze the meteorological requirements for safe launch and flight operations by a
commercial operator. Three gap analyses pertaining to meteorological requirements for
supporting commercial space operations were conducted using the strategic planning
model, which are described below.
The first gap analysis was conducted between meteorological regulations
pertinent to the commercial aviation industry and the meteorological regulations pertinent
to the commercial space industry. The analysis identified if any of the areas of the code
and regulations relating to meteorological concerns of the commercial space industry fall
below the same standard to which the aviation industry is held. A difference indicated a
lack of regulatory coverage regarding meteorological concerns for the commercial space
industry.
The second gap analysis evaluated the meteorological services provided to
aviation companies and the meteorological services provided to the commercial space
launch operators. The analysis was conducted to determine if a difference existed
between meteorological products and services used to support airlines and other
commercial aviation operators, and the products and services used to support commercial
space launch and flight operators. Included in this analysis were the services provided by
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the U.S. Air Force 45th Weather Squadron for launches from CCAFS. A difference
indicated a lack of meteorological products and/or services for the commercial space
industry.
The final gap analysis was conducted between the products and regulations
pertaining to the commercial space industry and the products and regulations necessary to
meet the needs prescribed by the Functional Analysis and Planning section of Lanicci’s
(2003) Strategic Planning Model. This analysis identified whether sufficient
meteorological products and regulations existed that could impact the safety of
commercial space launches.
Apparatus and materials. The analysis was conducted using an adapted version
of the Strategic Planning Model created by Lanicci (2003) (henceforth referred to as
Lanicci’s Strategic Planning Model). It was designed for use by the U.S. Air Force
Weather Agency following a 10-year period of reconfiguration of the Department of
Defense. Lanicci’s Strategic Planning Model is divided into three sections: Input,
Functional Analysis and Planning, and Execution. A pictorial view of this model can be
seen in Figure 3.
The first section, Input, describes the needs of the organization. For the U.S. Air
Force, it was concepts, strategies and doctrine. Lanicci (2003) examined the impact that
weather and climate had on planning and executing the concepts, strategies, and doctrine
of the U.S. Air Force and determining which aspects of strategy would be realistic or
unrealistic due to what is known about impacts of weather and climate on that strategy.
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Figure 3. Lanicci's Strategic Planning Model. Note. From Lanicci, 2003.

Functional Analysis and Planning is the second section of Lanicci’s Strategic
Planning Model. This section is the core of this model, performing a step-by-step
analysis of the weather aspects that an organization is sensitive to, identifying the
resulting deficiencies, defining the technology that is needed to resolve the deficiencies,
and identifying the resources needed to apply that technology. To facilitate this analysis,
this section is further divided into three subsections: Phenomenology, Technology, and
Force Structure. In the Phenomenology subsection, potential meteorological impacts are
identified and narrowed. Specific issues can be addressed once the aspects that will not
impact an industry are eliminated and the focus is set to an appropriate level. The second
subsection, Technology, identifies and describes what is needed to measure and predict
the phenomena important to the industry. This section is also where phenomena are
identified to be beyond the reasonable expense or technological capacity for
measurement. Lanicci (2003) also focused on the ability to observe and predict the effects
of these phenomena, not just the phenomena themselves. Finally, the Force Structure
subsection identifies the resources available for acquiring, implementing, or using the
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technology to observe and predict the phenomena and its potential effects. These
resources include financial, human, legislative, and organizational resources. An analysis
of this section can identify areas that are currently well-covered as well as areas with
insufficient resources.
The analysis includes the relative cost of products over 25 years. These costs are
bulk estimates based on approximations of technology purchase and installation costs for
the purposes of evaluating the relative cost-to-benefit of the technology. Based upon
these estimations, the costs fell into natural categories. The researcher divided the costs
into the following categories: negligible, low, moderate, high, and very high. Negligible
costs indicate the minimal expenses needed to acquire data from free online sources, such
as products from the NWS. Low costs represent estimated expenses of less than $100,000
a year, moderate costs represent estimated expenses between $100,000 and $1,000,000 a
year, high costs represent estimated expenses between $1,000,000 and $5,000,000 a year,
and very high costs represent estimated expenses over $5,000,000 a year. The ACA was
conducted by comparing the relative accuracy with the relative cost. The comparisons
were then ranked and sorted to provide the categories used.
The final section of Lanicci’s Strategic Planning Model is the Execution section.
In this section, actual operations following implementation of the new capabilities are
examined and reviewed. The review in this section provides continuous feedback for the
system to ensure that the lessons learned and shortcomings observed during
implementation are used to ensure success of future and intermediate iterations.
For this study, Lanicci’s Strategic Planning Model provided a strong framework
to identify the needs of the commercial space industry. It also provided significant data
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that was used to analyze gaps in meteorological regulations, services, and products to
meet the needs of the commercial space industry.
Design and procedures. For this analysis, Lanicci’s Strategic Planning Model
was adapted to the commercial space industry. Subsections were also adapted for the
needs of the commercial space industry. Specifically, Input focused on the estimated
meteorological considerations of the commercial space industry. It identified which
environmental conditions a company is sensitive to, and what environmental data is
required to be collected by the current regulations. Additionally, the third section in
Functional Analysis and Planning was changed from Force Structure in the original
model to Resource Structure in this study in order to apply the model beyond the military
aspects, and better identify how commercial organizations can implement technologies
necessary to ensure safe launches with respect to meteorological conditions. For the
purposes of this study, the Resource Structure was further divided into technology cost, a
cost-benefit analysis described as Accuracy-to-Cost Analysis (ACA), non-technical
company resource requirements, national coverage of the technology, and likelihood of
national implementation of the technology. The third section, Execution, was not
discussed, as it would require the actual implementation of the capabilities identified in
the previous two sections to evaluate adequately; that is beyond the scope of this study.
Three gap analyses were conducted following the analysis of the adapted version
of Lanicci’s Strategic Planning Model. The gap analyses used to answer Research
Questions 1 and 2 were performed by analyzing information acquired through the
literature review, while the gap analysis used to answer Research Question 3 compared
the output from the Resource Structure of the Function Analysis and Planning section of
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the model to the current meteorological products and regulations pertaining to the
commercial space industry.
Sources of the Data and Data Collection
The majority of the information acquired for this study came from a review of the
relevant federal codes and regulations, and literature pertaining to the needs of the
commercial space industry. Meteorological services provided by the U.S. Air Force 45th
Weather Squadron and launch commit criteria at CCAFS were acquired through
documentation and statements from launch weather officers.
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Chapter IV
Results
The adapted version of Lanicci’s Strategic Planning Model was applied to the
commercial space industry. A gap analysis was conducted between regulations for the
commercial aviation industry and the commercial space industry answering research
Question 1. Two gap analyses were conducted from the data gathered in the model,
answering research Questions 2 and 3, covering meteorological services and identifying
gaps in product and regulatory coverage for the commercial space industry. The results
are as follows.
Applying the Model: Input Stage
Compared to the meteorological regulations of the aviation industry, similar
regulations for the commercial space launch industry are in their infancy. Currently,
weather launch requirements come from two primary sources: the Launch Safety (2012)
section of the CFR, and the procedural documents of the United States Air Force, such as
those of the 45th Weather Squadron.
Current meteorological regulations for the space launch industry. Many of
the meteorological requirements for commercial space launch have come about in the last
2 to 6 years. Eight subsections of the Launch Safety (2012) section of the CFR covered
the primary meteorological regulations pertaining to the private space industry at the time
of this study.
The most substantial and detailed section of the meteorological regulations
pertaining to the commercial space industry is Appendix G to Launch Safety (2012). This
appendix, Natural and Triggered Flight Commit Criteria (2011), deals with very specific
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methods for mitigating lightning strikes, such as those that caused critical damage to
Atlas/Centaur 67. This section provides highly detailed descriptions of weather and
launch conditions that could cause a natural or triggered lightning strike to occur on a
launch vehicle. It also describes the conditions in which an operator is allowed to launch
a vehicle near any part of a thunderstorm, or around environments where triggered
lightning can occur, including very specific requirements for appropriate flight paths and
appropriate launch delay times (Natural and Triggered Lightning Flight Commit Criteria,
2011).
Each operator must adhere to written safety rules that include, among other
things, identifying applicable weather conditions in which the launch vehicle can carry
out its mission without having any negative impacts on public safety. These rules must be
approved by the FAA’s Office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST) prior to
commencing initial launch operations for a company’s first launch. The AST is the
FAA’s office that deals with all space-related regulations for the US. Included in the rules
submitted to the AST must be all the conditions stipulated under the Natural and
Triggered Lightning Flight Commit Criteria (2011).
In addition to having these rules in effect, launch operators must have a launch
readiness review submitted to the AST. This review must contain the written decision to
continue, based upon all factors that could impact the launch, listed out in the Reviews
(2006) section of this part of the CFR, including the status of the launch weather
forecasts. Prior to launch, the AST must be consulted to ensure that the launch is within
the operator’s written safety rules already approved by the FAA/AST (Reviews, 2006).
The Launch Safety Officer, a staff member of a Launch Operator in charge of ensuring
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the safety of the flight, must prove to the AST that the time delay for any hardware
relaying meteorological data is within the accepted limitations described by the AST
(Time Delay, 2006).
The majority of the remaining meteorological regulations pertaining to the
commercial space industry deal with specific parameters to ensure the safety of the
population on the ground rather than the safety of the flight. These include wind
weighing to ensure an unguided launch vehicle stays on course (Flight Safety Analysis
Methodologies, 2006), ensuring a launch can be terminated if the rocket guidance fails or
is unable to correct for another error (Support Systems, 2006), and ensuring overpressure
blast effects do not impact the general population, which can occur when a launch vehicle
is ignited and damage persons and buildings (Far Field Blast Overpressure Effects
Analysis, 2006; Far Field Overpressure Blast Effects Analysis, 2006; Troclet et al.,
2005).
NASA weather requirements for launch. The Department of Defense has even
stricter requirements on launch safety when it pertains to weather conditions. For
launches at KSC and CCAFS, launch weather is covered by the 45th Weather Squadron
(McNamara, Roeder, & Merceret, 2009). According to the U.S. Air Force Range
Planning and Operations instruction, hourly weather observations must be taken for
temperature, visibility, altimeter setting (atmospheric pressure), cloud ceiling, and surface
and aloft winds in order to ensure that no significant change will occur prior to launch
(U.S. Air Force, 2011). It also requires all personnel be trained to have adequate
knowledge of local weather hazards, and the officer-in-charge of the test range must have
specific training on the weather limitations for each launch and how to obtain and analyze
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meteorological data to ensure the meteorological limitations of a launch are not exceeded
(U.S. Air Force, 2011).
Applying the model: Function Analysis and Planning
Using literature on the topic, phenomena important to the commercial space
industry were analyzed using the Functional Analysis and Planning section of Lanicci’s
Strategic Planning Model. From the Phenomenology section, the technology that is
commonly used to assess these phenomena was applied, and a review was created to
analyze the usefulness and cost effectiveness of the technology. After establishing
relevant technology, the resources needed by a company to use this technology beyond
the expense of the equipment, including human and support requirements, were
discussed. Finally, the availability of this equipment from national sources was evaluated,
and the likelihood of the NWS beginning operations with that technology was reviewed.
Phenomenology. Many meteorological conditions can negatively impact the
safety of a space launch. Kingwell, Shimizu, Narita, Kawabata, & Shimizu (1991)
assembled a fairly comprehensive list of weather conditions that could affect a successful
launch. The categories used in their article were: (a) lightning, (b) wind velocity and
turbulence profile, (c) temperature, (d) high altitude ice or ash clouds, (e) precipitation,
(f) visibility, (g) cloud ceiling, and (h) supercooled water.
As seen in the Atlas/Centaur 67 mission, lightning can be devastating to the
success of a launch (Uman & Rackov, 2003). Lightning can damage electrical systems
(including the flight termination system), or the structural equipment of a launch vehicle,
endanger personnel and facilities on the ground, or even cause the destruction of the
launch vehicle itself (Kingwell et al., 1991). Due to this threat, lightning is also the most
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critical condition in the current commercial space launch regulations. Two different types
of lightning are of concern to launches: natural lightning and triggered lightning. Natural
lightning typically occurs during a thunderstorm to equalize the unbalanced electric
charge that developed inside the thunderstorm. Triggered lightning can occur when no
natural lightning has occurred. The cause of triggered lightning is similar to natural
lightning, an imbalance of electrical charge. The difference comes from the need for a
conduit for the triggered lightning to flow through, that is, an area where the electrical
resistance is lower than the atmosphere around it. When a rocket is launched, the vehicle
and the exhaust plume trailing behind it can provide a path of low-resistance for the
electrical charge to travel through, thus triggering a lightning strike (Qui et al., 2007).
Wind and turbulence information is important to launch for a variety of reasons.
Wind can affect the launch path, dynamic pressures on the launch vehicle during ascent,
dispersion of debris and the exhaust plume, the safety of crews working on a launch pad,
and the stability of a rocket while secured on a launch pad. In particular for unguided
vehicles, proper wind analysis, forecasting, and weighing the accuracy and applicability
of the observations ensures the launch vehicle remains on its planned flight path. Due to
the concerns associated with wind conditions, a large portion of the commercial space
launch regulation is devoted to wind analysis. Other impacts of wind and turbulence on
launch vehicles include aerodynamic stresses during launch, exterior booster separation
and recovery, and impacts on the hazardous range of noise and blast damage (Kingwell et
al., 1991).
Temperature can pose a large risk for launches, as seen with STS-51-L
(Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, 1986). Components
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of a craft may be sensitive to cold or hot temperatures while on the pad and during
launch. Additionally, super-cold liquid fuel tanks may have a limit on the temperature
differential that can easily induce ice accumulation. Temperature extremes can also
significantly impact engine performance, an impact that could cause the payload to fail to
reach orbit despite the successful operation of the launch vehicle. Additionally,
temperature could have an impact on corrosion if equipment is sitting on a launch pad for
an extended period (Kingwell et al., 1991).
High altitude ice or ash clouds can also damage a rocket during launch. As a
rocket must accelerate to a high velocity to enter orbit around Earth, even relatively small
particles in the atmosphere can cause serious damage to a spacecraft. The small ice and
ash particles can damage thermal tiles and exterior panels of spacecraft during launch and
can seriously impact the operation of equipment such as antennas that are vital to the
success of many space launches (Kingwell et al., 1991).
Precipitation, cloud ceilings, and surface visibility can significantly impact the
success of a rocket launch. Precipitation and cloud ceilings can both reduce visibility
prior to and during launch, and any visibility obscurations can inhibit the ability for
ground personnel to visually track the rocket (Kingwell et al., 1991). This could make it
difficult for ground personnel to terminate a launch if a failure is occurring, in violation
of launch safety regulations (Support Systems, 2006). Visibility can also impact recovery
operations of external boosters separated during launch. Precipitation, in particular, can
indicate the presence of other conditions which could be dangerous to the safety of a
launch, including lightning and high winds (Kingwell et al., 1991). Precipitation also
includes hail, which can seriously damage a launch vehicle, as it did with the external
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tank and SRBs of STS-117, which was forced to return to NASA’s Vehicle Assembly
Building due to damage caused by golf-ball-sized hail (Jones, 2007).
Supercooled water in the launch path of a rocket can dramatically impact a
launch. When supercooled water comes in contact with a surface, it freezes in a layer of
ice. As this layer of ice builds up, it can significantly alter the aerodynamics of a launch
vehicle. Ice accumulation can cause additional fuel to be spent overcoming the increased
drag, control surfaces to no longer be able to keep a rocket on its correct path, or even
cause the pressure build-up in front of a rocket to exceed structural limitations (Kingwell
et al., 1991).
One factor not considered by Kingwell et al. (1991) is space weather, an issue that
is understated by many studies evaluating launch commit criteria. Tretkoff (2010)
discussed the crucial need for predicting space weather events due to expected increases
in commercial space travelers. He expressed concerns over varying levels of radiation
and solar energetic particles, such as those produced by coronal mass ejections (CME). A
CME is one type of space weather phenomenon that is produced by the Sun during a
reconfiguration of its corona. A CME represents the expulsion of super-hot coronal
plasma at high speeds, which streams high-energy particles in the direction of the ejection
(Lewis & Simnett, 1999). Another space-weather phenmenon produced by the Sun are
the solar winds. The solar winds are also particles ejected from the Sun. These streams of
hot particles, usually contained within the Sun’s corona due to the strong magnetic field
produced by the Sun, escape at two speeds: either fast or slow. Fast solar winds are
typically believed to escape from the polar regions of the Sun, where the lines of
magnetic flux are less organized. Slow solar winds bubble out from regions of the Sun
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that are typically constrained by the magnetic flux fields such as at the Sun’s equator
(Glanz, 1997). Both solar flares and CMEs disperse solar energetic particles (SEP),
capable of disrupting or even damaging electronics in space (Space Studies Board, 2008).
All three of these solar conditions could jeopardize the safety of a commercial space
launch; better observation and forecasting techniques must be developed (Trekoff, 2010).
Technology. Many technologies exist to measure the phenomena that can
negatively impact the commercial space launch industry. A detailed analysis has been
assembled in Appendix A analyzing many of the technologies used in gathering data in
the aviation and space launch industries. This analysis includes relative accuracy, which
accounts for both the ability to observe the phenomena and detail in which the equipment
can measure the phenomena. For example, when examining precipitation-measuring
technologies, a standard sensor on an ASOS unit can measure the amount of rain or snow
falling at a single point relatively well. However, the ASOS measurement is the
precipitation at a single point (FAA, 2008), whereas a Doppler radar unit, such as those
used by the NWS, may not be able to measure precipitation to the tenth of an inch, but it
can measure precipitation falling over a large area (124 to 248 nautical miles, depending
on the observation mode the radar is in) and consecutive images can convey the
movement and development/dissipation of the precipitation (FAA, 2010). Aircraft
observation can provide accurate precipitation indications for its flight path, but does
have some drawbacks, including the inability to provide the large-scale observations,
including storm movement as a radar unit can. This comparison can be seen in Table 2.

40
Table 2
Technology Analysis for Observing Precipitation
Equipment

Relative
Accuracy

Relative Cost
(Over 25 years)

ACA

ASOS

Moderate

Low

Moderate

Doppler Weather Radar

High

Negligible

Very Strong

Aircraft Observations

Moderately High

High

Weak

Note. From Appendix A

Many methods exist to measure wind speed and direction, each sensitive to within
a single knot of wind speed. Table 3 contains an excerpt from the model data from
Appendix A, specifically the section on wind instrumentation.

Table 3
Technology Analysis for Observing Wind and Turbulence Condition
Equipment

Relative
Accuracy

Relative Cost
(Over 25 years)

ACA

Instrument Towers

High

Low

Strong

Sodar/Wind Profiler

High

Low

Strong

ASOS Anemometer

High

Low

Strong

Doppler Weather Radar

Moderate

Negligible

Strong

Upper Air Soundings

Moderate

Low

Moderate

Aircraft Observations

Moderate

High

Moderate

Note. From Appendix A
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Instrument towers in the network at CCAFS, which have a series of
measurements over their length, can measure winds at different altitudes throughout the
range. ASOS units, often using the same instruments as the towers, have similar
accuracy, and can track the surface winds (Kingwell et al., 1991). Doppler radar can also
track winds, but only through calculations based on radar reflectivity, and only when
precipitation is occurring (Warning Decision Training Branch, 2012). Upper air
soundings, typically free-flying balloons carrying a package of instruments called a
radiosonde, are often used to track winds at higher altitudes, and more advanced
technology has made these measurements more sensitive than ever. A drawback to this
method is that the balloons are fully free-flying and can drift considerably with altitude as
the balloon’s course is altered by the wind. When a balloon reaches its maximum altitude,
it may be over 100 kilometers from the point it was released, whereas a rocket launched
from the same site may only be 4 or 5 kilometers from the launch site (Kingwell et al.,
1991). To address this known deficiency of balloon-borne radiosondes, another wind
measurement is acquired at CCAFS, collected by wind profilers. These profilers are able
to collect wind and turbulence data directly over the site, up to an altitude of
approximately 16 kilometers (52,493 ft.), compared to balloon-based upper air
measurements that can reach upwards of 20 kilometers (65,000 ft.) (Martner et al., 1993).
Martner et al. found that profilers were able to collect over 85% of the data with a vertical
resolution, or data spacing, of approximately 200 meters (650 ft.).
The ability to forecast these phenomena are important to making launch decisions
as well. For many of the phenomena, such as temperature, precipitation, cloud ceilings,
and visibility, forecast accuracy is high. A forecast verification performed on the 2003-
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2004 winter season for a difficult area of terrain by the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) found temperature forecast accuracy to be within 3
degrees Celsius for forecast periods of 48 hours or less (Myrick & Horel, 2006). Myrick
and Horel found wind speed and temperature to be similarly accurate. Forecasts for other
weather phenomena are less reliable. Two phenomena currently difficult to forecast, but
essential to the commercial space industry, are lightning and space weather.
No current products exist that are approved to predict lightning for aviation.
Walterscheid (2010) presented evidence that correlates lightning prediction to an icing
prediction product, the Current Icing Product (CIP), an experimental product designed to
forecast icing probability and intensity. However, as lightning data is used in the CIP to
predict icing associated with convective activity, it may be found that this correlation is
not causation. Statistical models have been created in an attempt to forecast probability of
cloud-to-ground lightning (Shafer & Fuelberg, 2008). The model created by Shafer and
Fuelberg was shown to be reliable for a number of summer seasons in Florida, though
this model and others like it are unable to predict cloud-to-cloud lightning or a charged
atmosphere in which triggered lightning could be produced.
Forecasting space weather events is in its infancy; although recent research has
been conducted that may increase our capability to predict solar events (Strong, Saba, &
Kucera, 2012). Coordinated interagency attention on improving the forecasting of space
weather events began in 1994 in the US due to the increasing impact of these events on
aviation and other industries (Fisher, 2003). Our current ability to forecast is primarily
limited to the solar cycle and data observed from the Sun (Strong et al., 2012). Magnetic
activity in the Sun follows a cycle that is approximately 22 years in length, with 11 years
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between each solar maximum (Strong et al., 2012). Figure 4 shows solar activity,
identified by the number of sunspots visible, for the last 2.5 full solar cycles (Strong et
al., 2012). Knowledge of this cycle provides forecasters with a general idea of the
likelihood of a space weather event impacting Earth. Observing solar events from
satellite and solar observatories allows very short-term forecasting, or more correctly, the
data from these systems can calculate the arrival time of solar events from their time of
occurrence to the time of impact on Earth (Strong et al., 2012).

Figure 1. Solar activity, 1954-2011. Note. From Strong et al., 2012.

Resource structure. The Resource Structure of Lanicci’s Strategic Planning
Model is used to analyze the relative cost for the technology, the ACA, the resources a
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company would need to use this technology, national coverage of the technology, and the
likelihood of national coverage existing in the near future.
The second set of data from the model is located in Appendix B. This appendix
contains information regarding the resources a company must have access to, in order to
utilize the different technologies discussed in this study. It also contains information
regarding whether or not a company building a new spaceport would likely have
coverage from the current products nationally, and the likelihood of this coverage
extending to cover a spaceport if coverage does not already exist.
A company’s resource needs are a subjective measure, based upon the amount of
processing needed on the data gathered by a particular technology. Other needs include
maintenance for new equipment, aircraft cost, operations and maintenance, and satellite
operations. These specific costs are not estimated due to the high variability in each of
those services. While these needs are important considerations, a small company might
not have the capacity to conduct larger operations, such as aircraft observations or solar
observatory operations.
National coverage and national likelihood are based upon the availability of data
for a random location in the US to have coverage. For example, ASOS coverage is
possible at launch site locations, as many of the current launch sites are associated with
airports. The likelihood of an ASOS being set up at a new spaceport is low, and only
likely to occur if traffic at the spaceport becomes high. Doppler radar coverage is
common at most places in the continental US, but if a company were to set up its
operations where coverage was unavailable, it is unlikely a new radar site would be
created to accommodate the facility due to the expense of purchasing, installing, and
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maintaining a new radar facility. For upper air soundings, a national launch network
exists, but if a company is in need of accurate wind speeds, the data may be too far away
to accommodate their launches, and it would be unlikely that the NWS would set up a
new balloon launch site to improve coverage.
For lightning data in particular, changes to national coverage are not likely to
occur. Presently, lightning data is available nationally from commercial vendors who
contract with the NWS to provide the data (Krider & Koshak, 2003), but real-time data
from these contractors costs money. The development of this network stemmed from the
federal government not funding a NWS project to create a network as they have with
other data sources such as upper air soundings and radar (Orville & Huffines, 2001). One
issue with public lightning networks is related to the nature of the lightning they sense.
Networks like Vaisala’s National Lightning Data Network (NLDN) and WSI’s United
States Precision Lightning Network (USPLN) rely on time-of-arrival (TOA) sensors and
magnetic direction finding (MDF), which record the radio signals produced by lightning
strikes, and triangulates their location with other sensors on the network (Vaisala, 2011;
WSI, n.d.). Due to the need for triangulation when using TOA and MDF sensors, some
cloud-to-cloud lightning events are not recorded, since the TOA and MDF sensors
receive conflicting data indicating the source of the strike in multiple locations
horizontally (Krider & Koshak, 2003). This means that some data potentially vital to the
commercial space industry could be left out of reports. Lightning analysis and forecasting
is extremely important. Current lightning launch commit criteria are less stringent than
they were 10 years ago, but the lack of accurate lightning forecasting means that many
launches must be canceled, to err on the side of safety (McNamara et al., 2009).
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Presently, lightning is one of the most common meteorological reasons for the scrub of a
launch, with only upper level winds possibly canceling more flights (Roeder & Madura,
2004).
Gap Analyses
Research Question 1. A gap analysis was conducted to identify if a gap existed
in meteorological regulations between the commercial aviation industry and the
commercial space industry. Multiple gaps were found between the regulations. The
largest gap relates to the responsibility for meteorological data. For aviation, the
Secretary of Commerce is responsible “to the highest possible degree… observe,
measure, investigate and study atmospheric phenomena” and make forecasts, and to
maintain facilities to do so. Their responsibility includes making reports and distributing
it to people involved in air commerce (Meteorological Services, 2012). The Secretary of
Commerce uses the NWS and AWC to fulfill these responsibilities. No similar law exists
to provide these same services to the commercial space industry. Additionally, specific
meteorological regulations do not exist similar to the Basic VFR Weather Minimums
(2004), Takeoff and Landing Under IFR (2009), and the weather responsibilities
discussed in the AIM (FAA, 2012).
Research Question 2. A second gap analysis was conducted to identify if a gap
existed between the meteorological services provided for commercial aviation companies
and airports and the meteorological services provided for commercial space companies
and spaceports. It was found that all of the services available to aviation were provided to
commercial space companies at the present time for launch operations conducted at or
around current airports. For launch operations that are occurring or will occur at facilities
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that are not located on a current airfield, nor at KSC, CCAFS, or the Western Range at
Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, meteorological services would not be equivalent
to those provided for aviation. Primarily, surface measurements, such as those provided
by ASOS instruments would not be available. Doppler radar services may not be
available either, depending on the location of the airport. Kodiak Launch Complex in
Alaska is an example of a spaceport that needed to purchase its own launch weather
equipment, as it falls outside of many of the national weather data networks. This launch
facility is not located within the range of any of the current NWS weather radar sites. It
was also built as a new facility and did not have access to the equipment typically located
at commercial airports (FAA, 2011). Other facilities could be set up in areas with
insufficient data coverage and face a similar need to purchase equipment and plan their
own meteorological support.
Additionally, many products and forecasts are created for aviation that can be
used without changes by the commercial space industry, provided they remain free to
access as they are presently for aviation. Examples of applicable products include: (a)
surface analyses to cover the current weather condition from a regional and national basis
and prognosis charts to provide information on surface conditions over the next 24 hours,
(b) winds aloft charts, which would provide weighted wind data from across the
continental US, (c) SIGMETs, which provide forecast information for convective
activity, turbulence, icing, (d) AIRMETs, which provide forecast information for
turbulence, icing and weather conditions that may restrict flight tracking and (e)
METARs/TAFs, for launch facilities co-located at an airport, which provide observed
and forecast surface data for launch facilities. Additionally, commercial space companies
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would have access to the same weather radar data and satellite imagery as the aviation
industry, allowing them to properly gauge precipitation and cloud cover over a
company’s facilities.
Research Question 3. A third gap analysis was conducted to identify if a the
meteorological products and regulations that are currently in existence are sufficient to
meet the estimated needs of commercial space operators for safe operations.
Currently, a majority of the services provided to aviation are available to the
commercial space launch industry, and those services would serve the commercial space
launch industry well for measuring the weather phenomena the commercial space
industry would likely require. Lightning detection is one area where a gap likely exists.
Presently, a commercial aviation company can access for free all of the meteorological
information they need to safely conduct a flight, a measure that companies could possibly
avoid to cut expenses. Commercial launch companies will be forced to purchase some
required data, specifically lightning data. Additionally, space weather data cannot
currently be predicted to the level that is necessary to ensure the safety of flight from a
meteorological standpoint.
By law, the meteorological products and basic services provided to aviation are
guaranteed to be provided (Meteorological Services, 2012). A similar guarantee does not
exist for the commercial space industry, therefore a gap exists. Finally, as wording for
most meteorological regulations is on par with that of the aviation industry, a gap was not
found between current and necessary regulations.
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Chapter V
Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
The purpose of this study was to identify the gaps between the aviation and the
commercial space industries regarding meteorological regulations, services, and products
in order to estimate the meteorological needs of the commercial space industry. The
results support the hypothesis that gaps do exist between the aviation and commercial
space industries.
Discussion
A noteworthy gap was identified between the aviation and commercial space
industries relating to the legislative requirements for providing meteorological services
and products. Aviation has relied on these products and services provided free of charge
by the NWS to observe and predict the weather phenomena crucial to maintaining safe
operations. Though companies have the option of hiring external meteorological support,
the option of free data from the NWS is available to them. Commercial space launch
companies have access to these products and services through the same sources, which
cover many of the phenomena the commercial space industry required for safe operations
as well. The federal government is not required to continue providing these products free
of charge to anyone beyond those engaged in air commerce or air navigation under the
current laws (Aviation Programs, 2012; National and Commercial Space Programs,
2010). A budget could be passed that requires the NWS to charge users outside aviation
for these services, and thus the commercial space industry would no longer be able
receive this data essential to launch safety. It is possible that, without a legislative
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change, these same products and services would no longer be available to the commercial
space industry.
A gap was also found between regulations for the commercial space industry and
the aviation industry. This gap related to the Basic VFR Weather Minimums (2004),
Takeoff and Landing Under IFR (2009), and the weather responsibilities discussed in the
AIM (FAA, 2012). This gap is not considered to be particularly important. The aviation
industry, both commercial and private, is sensitive to many of the same weather
phenomena. The commercial space industry has many different launch vehicles which
have significantly different vulnerabilities. Specific limitations on launch conditions may
hinder the commercial space industry more than help it. Commercial space launch
companies are required to create and submit to the FAA for approval a set of weather
criteria for the company’s launches as part of the company’s written rule document. This
process is nearly identical to the process an airline must undergo for approval of the
weather minimums in their standard operating procedures. It was therefore deemed that
no changes need to be made based upon this gap.
An additional gap was found to be possible concerning available surface
meteorological data available if a newly established launch facility was not co-located at
an airport or on a federal launch range. This gap specifically deals with the availability of
meteorological equipment and data coverage. Specifically, radar coverage does not cover
every possible launch location within the US. This is illustrated at Kodiak Launch
Complex in Alaska, where coverage from the NWS Doppler radar site in Anchorage does
not extend to cover the facility. Kodiak Launch Complex was the first newly established
launch facility within the US, and had to set up many of the technologies necessary to
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adequately observe weather at their location, including field mills to detect lightning and
charge build up, surface analysis for phenomena such as wind, temperature and cloud
ceiling, and a commercial weather radar unit (Sardonia & Madura, 2002). While some
companies may have enough money to buy this costly equipment; if the federal
government does not require or provide this equipment at approved spaceports,
companies may purchase only the most essential equipment to reduce costs.
Many weather products are produced for aviation, providing a multi-tiered
approach to analyze and forecast weather phenomena. The second gap analysis found
many products produced for aviation were sufficient to cover the needs of the
commercial space industry. The products discussed above, as well as many other
products created by the NWS, report and predict phenomena in sufficient detail to be
used for the commercial space industry, and are currently available to commercial space
companies. This means that, should the NWS be given the same responsibility to the
commercial space industry as the aviation industry, NWS would need to make few
modifications to serve the commercial space industry. Instead of another agency making
duplicate products for the commercial space industry, the funding could go to the NWS
to research methods of forecasting the phenomena the commercial space industry needs,
where no products exist.
Additional products that are needed for the commercial space industry include
products forecasting lightning potential, electrical charge, and a longer-range forecast of
space weather events. These products do not exist primarily because there is not
sufficient data to model these phenomena. Research should be conducted to provide more
advanced warning for these phenomena.
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Conclusions
The FAA is responsible for the safety of both the aviation industry and the
commercial space industry. Having evolved from the CAA, and presiding over the
regulatory changes related to aviation meteorology, the FAA has institutional memory of
the challenges that weather provided the early aviation industry. The adaptation of
aviation meteorological regulations to the commercial space industry was apparent in the
review of many current meteorological regulations for the commercial space industry,
and thus, gaps were still identified.
Additionally, due to the high cost of space launch operations, the federal
government has been the primary launch operator for the first 60 years of space launch.
Their operational dominance has provided them sufficient time to identify weather
conditions that need special consideration for the space launch industry, similar to
accidents in aviation in the 1980’s highlighting the need for windshear measurements in
aviation, to cite one example. Though tragic, the accidents suffered by NASA, the U.S.
Air Force, and JAXA resulted in the creation of a framework for identifying the weather
conditions that are particularly important during the launch of a spacecraft.
Overall, the commercial space industry benefits from the federal meteorological
regulations. More research and support is needed for observing and forecasting both
lightning and space weather events, though products currently produced for the aviation
industry cover the remainder of the critical weather phenomena for the commercial space
industry. Legislative changes should be made to ensure the NWS will continue to provide
these products to the commercial space industry, in much the same way as they do for
commercial aviation.
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Recommendations
Based upon the results, recommendations are appropriate for the FAA, the U.S.
Congress and commercial space launch companies. Additionally, meteorological topics
that could benefit from future study are discussed.
Recommendations to the FAA. The primary recommendations to the FAA relate
to areas that need continuing research. The current ability to forecast lightning may be
adequate for aviation, but to ensure launch safety for the commercial space industry,
more research needs to be conducted on methods of predicting lightning potential.
Additional research should also be conducted on the ability to forecast the conditions
necessary for triggered lightning to occur, perhaps through the use of products derived
from high-resolution numerical weather prediction models. Such research is needed
because so little investigation has been conducted on this subject. Further work on the
cessation of favorable lightning conditions is also needed.
Another aspect of meteorology that needs continued research is space weather
forecasting. To make rational launch decisions, companies require more than a three day
notice on the general likelihood of solar activity. Research should be conducted in an
attempt to extend the forecast window beyond three days and to make forecast as specific
as possible.
Instrument packages should also be deployed to approved commercial spaceports
as is done at major airports. In addition to a typical ASOS unit, which would be necessary
for gathering surface data, a small network of field mills could gather the necessary data
for commercial space launch operators to make evaluate the likelihood of lightning,
natural or triggered, during a launch. Having this equipment available would allow
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commercial space launch companies to make better decisions using more accurate
information on relevant atmospheric phenomenon.
Legislative recommendations. To ensure comprehensive weather support is
available to the commercial space industry, it is recommended that the U.S. Congress
pursue a legislative change to either: (a) amend the section of U.S. code under Aviation
Programs (2012) entitled Meteorological Services (2012) to replace “air commerce” with
“air and space commerce” each time “air commerce” is mentioned and replace “air
navigation” with “air navigation and space launch” each time “air navigation” is mention,
or change “air commerce” and “air navigation” to “operations under this title”, or (b)
amend U.S. Code entitled National and Commercial Space Programs (2010) to include a
weather commitment similar to the U.S. code Aviation Programs (2012) section entitled
Meteorological Services (2012).
Recommendations to commercial space launch companies. To enhance the
safety of the commercial launch programs, this study makes two recommendations. The
first recommendation is for companies that are not co-located at an existing launch range
to deploy weather instruments around launch facilities, regardless of support from the
FAA and NWS. Field mills are particularly important at sites supporting vertical
launches, to ensure no launches are conducted into an environment that could produce
triggered lightning. The second recommendation is to make use of the meteorological
products currently employed for the aviation industry. Utilizing these well-tested
products limits expenses associated with analyzing and forecasting weather with products
that provide duplicate data, which would allow more resources for analyzing phenomena
that are not adequately covered nationally, such as lightning.
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Further research. With the appropriate data and support from a commercial
space launch company, it is believed that Lanicci’s Strategic Planning Model can be
applied to an individual company to ensure its meteorology department or service has the
necessary capabilities to observe and predict the phenomena necessary to make
appropriate launch decisions. Such an analysis was beyond the scope of this study.
This study concentrated on launch operations of the commercial space industry.
Lanicci’s Strategic Planning Model additionally could be used to analyze ground
operations as well.
This study limited its review of the regulation of the commercial space industry to
those regulations pertaining to meteorology. A review of the remaining regulations of the
commercial space industry may also prove beneficial.
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Appendix A
Functional Analysis and Planning: Technology Analysis

64

Phenomenology

Lightning

Surface Visibility

Wind Profile/
Turbulence

Temperature
High Altitude
Ice/Ash Clouds

Precipitation

Cloud Ceilings

Super-cooled Water
Sun/Space

Instrument Towers

Surface Estimate

ASOS (and RVR)

Aircraft Observations

Satellite Observations

Cloud Analysis

TOA/Radio Inferometry

Electric Field Mill

Equipment

High

High

Moderate

Moderate

Moderate

Moderate

Low

Moderate

High

Relative Accuracy

Low

Low

Low

Negligible

High

Negligible (High)

Low

Moderate

Low

Relative Cost (Over 25 years)

Strong

Strong

Moderate

Strong

Very Weak

Strong(Very Weak)

Weak

Moderate

Strong

ACA

Technology

Sodar Profiler (UHF/VHF)

Strong

Strong

Low

Moderate

High

Low

Moderate

ASOS

Negligible

Strong(Very Weak)

Strong(Weak)

Moderately High

High

Moderate

Negligible (Moderate)

Low

Negligible (High)

Very Strong (Moderate)

Moderate

Upper Air Sounding

High

Low

Weak

Doppler Radar

Visual Ground Observations

Moderate

Negligible (High)

Moderateb

Moderate

Aircraft Radar/LIDAR

Moderatea

High

Moderate

Low

Satellite Observations

High

Low

Moderate

Moderate

ASOS

Moderately High

Low

Upper Air Soundings

Doppler Radar

Moderateb

Low

Strong

Aircraft Observations

Moderate

Moderate

Human Estimation

Moderately High

Very Weak

Low

Ceilometer (ASOS)

Very High

Moderate

High

Aircraft Observations

Moderate

Negligible

Strong (Weak)

High

Aircraft Observations

Low

Negligible (High)

Strong (Moderate)

High

Aircraft PIREPS

Moderately High

Negligible (Moderate)

ASOS

Satellite Observations

Moderately High

Aircraft Observations

Solar Observatory Data
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Notes: Table include options for companies to install facilities that provide information
publicly and nationally in parentheses. aASOS precipitation is measured at a single point,
so accuracy is not comparable to Doppler radar measurements. bHuman observation
accuracy varies greatly with level of experience and skill.
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Appendix B
Functional Analysis and Planning: Resource Structure Analysis
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Instrument Towers

Surface Estimate

ASOS (and RVR)

Aircraft Observations

Satellite Observations

Cloud Analysis

Time of Arrival/Radio Inferometry

Electric Field Mill

Equipment

Strong

Strong

Moderate

Strong

Very Weak

Strong(Very Weak)

Weak

Moderate

Strong

ACA

Small Met. Department, Maintenance

Met. Department, Maintenance

Small Met. Department, Maintenance

Small Met. Department

Small Met. Department, Maintenance

Met Dept., A/C Ops and Maintenance

Small Met. Dept., (Satellite Operations)

Small Met. Department

Met. Department, Maintenance

Small Met. Department, Maintenance

Company Resourcesa

Possible Coverage

Most Likely Not

No

No

Possible Coverage

No

Private

No

Private1

No

National Coverage

Lowb

Very Low

Low

Not Likely

Lowb

Not Likely

Not Likely

Low

Not Likely

Low

National Likelihood

Resource Structure

Sodar/Wind Profiler (UHF/VHF)
Strong

Technology

ASOS

Low

Not Likely

Not Likely

Likely Covered

“Coverage” exists

Not Likely

Small Met. Dept. (Met and Maint.)

Met. Department, Maintenance

No

N/A

Strong(Weak)

Small Met. Department

No

Lowb

Doppler Radar

Strong

Met Dept., A/C Ops and Maintenance

Yes

Not Likely

Low

Moderate

Small Met. Dept., (Satellite Operations)

Possible Coverage

Low

“Coverage” exists

Radiosonde

Moderate

Small Met. Department, Maintenance

Likely Covered

Not Likely

Met. Department, Maintenance

Visual Ground Observations

Strong(Very Weak)

Small Met. Dept. (Large and Maint.)

No

Lowb

Moderate

Aircraft Radar/LIDAR

Moderate

Met Dept., A/C Ops and Maintenance

No

Not Likely

Upper Air Soundings

Satellite Observations

Very Strong (Moderate)

Small Met. Department

No

Possible Coverage

Low

ASOS

Weak

Small Met. Department, Maintenance

Not Likely

Doppler Radar

Moderate

Met Dept., A/C Ops and Maintenance

No

Aircraft Observations

Moderate

Not Likely

Possible Coverage

Human Estimation

Moderate

No

N/A

Small Met. Department, Maintenance

Ceilometer (ASOS)

Met Dept., A/C Ops and Maintenance

Yes

N/A

Met Dept., A/C Ops and Maintenance

Aircraft Observations

Very Weak

Small Met. Department

Yes

N/A

Strong

Aircraft Observations

Moderate

Small Met. Dept., (Satellite Operations)

Yes

Moderate

Aircraft PIREPS

Strong (Weak)

Small Met. Dept., (Large and Maint.)

ASOS

Satellite Observations

Strong (Moderate)

Aircraft Observations

Solar Observatory Data
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Notes: aMet. in this category, is short for meteorology. A/C stands for Aircraft. Satellite
Operations would also need larger meteorology departments to process the data, as would
solar observatories and Doppler radar sites. Estimates are based upon the amount of data
that would need human involvement in processing. bIf a spaceport is established at a
location that is not already an airport, the likelihood of the FAA, NWS, or DoD setting up
an automated weather station is unlikely.

